2026-09-18 Alibaba Cloud host bootstrap evidence

Scope

This is real cloud deployment evidence for the owner-authorized first test Cell. It is not W13-b/P1 or production acceptance: the Go binary still has no production ARI/SIP/ExternalMedia/call-execution path, and no real provider call was initiated from this host. The host later ran a separately isolated, mock-only Asterisk/PJSIP/PJSUA2/ARI compatibility stack; those results are recorded in the W09 evidence documents below.

Region: cn-beijing
Instance: i-2zeb69p1fo75r92wplbz
Status: Running
Image: debian_13_6_x64_20G_alibase_20260828.vhd (Debian 13)
Type/charge: ecs.e-c1m1.large, PostPaid, owner-selected SpotAsPriceGo
Zone: cn-beijing-g
EIP: 123.56.71.98, allocation eip-2zeevfsaxzwuue2szy7xb, InUse by the instance
Security group: sg-2zed6d5vmcvojt7zek4r
SSH key: existing mac_ed25519, matching the required rogee public key
Release binary SHA-256: 6047a9a6a1f52db52e326167f1f50a17d8c46c34b34327294657d35c87d10cf9

The initial RunInstances request was rejected for insufficient balance. After account eligibility was restored, the same persisted request/client token passed DryRun and was applied. No second EIP, unrelated instance, or new key pair was used.

Host hardening

Host ED25519 key was scanned twice and was stable at SHA256:k1OBPlQcjYo5DqO2sbvcJEpdoqKNuWZHBreHSVB24pQ; the stale EIP entry was replaced only after confirming the EIP was now attached to this new instance.
User rogee (UID 1000) was created with only the required public key.
PasswordAuthentication no, KbdInteractiveAuthentication no, PermitRootLogin no, public-key authentication, and AllowUsers rogee were applied and sshd -t passed.
Root SSH login was rejected after the hardening reload.
Subsequent host commands used SSH as rogee and the restricted sudoers file; no root command was used after final hardening.
Existing security-group rules were inspected. TCP 22 is open for the required administration path; UDP/SIP/RTP rules are limited to the recorded provider/diagnostic source IPs and no 0.0.0.0/0 UDP rule was added.

Release smoke

The release binary was copied over SSH to /opt/sip-go-agent/sip-go-agent and local/remote SHA-256 matched. On the Debian host, both commands completed in explicit mock mode and returned valid JSON:

SIP_GO_AGENT_MODE=mock ... /opt/sip-go-agent/sip-go-agent agent
SIP_GO_AGENT_MODE=mock ... /opt/sip-go-agent/sip-go-agent dispatcher

The smoke only proves the binary, directories, permissions, SQLite/file spool startup, and non-production mode on the real host. It does not prove mTLS Dispatcher/Agent interop, a management-approved static artifact, production Asterisk loading, Agent ARI/RTP/PCMA integration, AI suppliers, OSS/MQ, or a phone call.

Isolated mock compatibility follow-up

Docker was installed on this host for an isolated mock-only Asterisk container. The pinned Asterisk 22.10.1 image was transferred from the local cache because Docker Hub was unreachable from the host. The container was loopback-restricted for ARI/SIP publication and used no provider credentials. Runtime results:

docs/evidence/20260918-w09-ari-runtime.md
docs/evidence/20260918-w09-sip-ari.md
docs/evidence/20260918-w09-sip-rtp-ari.md

These documents prove only the disposable mock compatibility layers and do not change the host's production or real-provider status.

Resource state and cleanup

The instance and EIP remain running/attached for the next explicitly authorized step. Spot interruption can terminate the host and does not migrate calls. Do not stop/delete the instance or release/unbind the fixed EIP without a separate user cleanup instruction.

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