Harden brainstorm companion auth regressions

This commit is contained in:
Drew Ritter
2026-06-10 14:58:16 -07:00
committed by Drew Ritter
parent fe812c418f
commit a2e67bbd9b
9 changed files with 320 additions and 34 deletions

View File

@@ -152,6 +152,20 @@ h1 { color: #333; } p { color: #666; } code { background: #f0f0f0; padding: 0.1e
<p>This page needs the full URL your coding agent gave you, including the
<code>?key=&hellip;</code> part. Copy the complete URL and open it again.</p></body></html>`;
function bootstrapPage(key) {
const jsonKey = JSON.stringify(String(key));
return `<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Opening Brainstorm Companion</title></head>
<body>
<script>
try { sessionStorage.setItem('brainstorm-session-key', ${jsonKey}); } catch (e) {}
location.replace('/');
</script>
</body>
</html>`;
}
const frameTemplate = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'frame-template.html'), 'utf-8');
const helperScript = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'helper.js'), 'utf-8');
const helperInjection = '<script>\n' + helperScript + '\n</script>';
@@ -178,6 +192,21 @@ function getNewestScreen() {
return files.length > 0 ? files[0].path : null;
}
function isRegularFileInsideContentDir(filePath) {
let stat, realContentDir, realFilePath;
try {
stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return false;
if (!stat.isFile()) return false;
if (stat.nlink !== 1) return false;
realContentDir = fs.realpathSync(CONTENT_DIR);
realFilePath = fs.realpathSync(filePath);
} catch (e) {
return false;
}
return realFilePath.startsWith(realContentDir + path.sep);
}
// ========== Authentication ==========
function timingSafeEqualStr(a, b) {
@@ -203,8 +232,11 @@ function parseCookies(header) {
function isAuthorized(req) {
const q = req.url.indexOf('?');
if (q >= 0) {
const key = new URLSearchParams(req.url.slice(q + 1)).get('key');
if (key && timingSafeEqualStr(key, TOKEN)) return true;
const params = new URLSearchParams(req.url.slice(q + 1));
if (params.has('key')) {
const key = params.get('key');
return Boolean(key && timingSafeEqualStr(key, TOKEN));
}
}
const cookie = parseCookies(req.headers['cookie'])[COOKIE_NAME];
if (cookie && timingSafeEqualStr(cookie, TOKEN)) return true;
@@ -216,25 +248,53 @@ function pathnameOf(url) {
return q >= 0 ? url.slice(0, q) : url;
}
function queryKey(url) {
const q = url.indexOf('?');
if (q < 0) return null;
return new URLSearchParams(url.slice(q + 1)).get('key');
}
function securityHeaders(headers = {}) {
return {
'Referrer-Policy': 'no-referrer',
'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
'Content-Security-Policy': "frame-ancestors 'none'",
'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy': 'same-origin',
...headers
};
}
function isAllowedWebSocketOrigin(req) {
const origin = req.headers.origin;
if (!origin) return true;
const host = req.headers.host;
if (!host) return false;
return origin === 'http://' + host;
}
// ========== HTTP Request Handler ==========
function handleRequest(req, res) {
if (!isAuthorized(req)) {
res.writeHead(403, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' });
res.writeHead(403, securityHeaders({ 'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' }));
res.end(FORBIDDEN_PAGE);
return;
}
touchActivity(); // only authorized requests count as activity
// Mirror the key into a cookie so same-origin subresources (/files/*) and the
// WebSocket handshake carry it automatically, whatever URL style the agent
// writes. SameSite=Strict: a cross-site page can neither read the key nor ride
// the cookie; HttpOnly: page scripts can't exfiltrate it.
// Mirror the key into a cookie so same-origin subresources (/files/*) can
// authenticate after bootstrap. HttpOnly keeps it away from page scripts; the
// WebSocket Origin check below is what blocks cross-origin localhost injection.
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
COOKIE_NAME + '=' + TOKEN + '; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/');
const pathname = pathnameOf(req.url);
if (req.method === 'GET' && pathname === '/') {
const keyFromQuery = queryKey(req.url);
if (req.method === 'GET' && pathname === '/' && keyFromQuery && timingSafeEqualStr(keyFromQuery, TOKEN)) {
res.writeHead(200, securityHeaders({ 'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' }));
res.end(bootstrapPage(keyFromQuery));
} else if (req.method === 'GET' && pathname === '/') {
const screenFile = getNewestScreen();
let html = screenFile
? (raw => isFullDocument(raw) ? raw : wrapInFrame(raw))(fs.readFileSync(screenFile, 'utf-8'))
@@ -246,24 +306,24 @@ function handleRequest(req, res) {
html += helperInjection;
}
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' });
res.writeHead(200, securityHeaders({ 'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' }));
res.end(html);
} else if (req.method === 'GET' && pathname.startsWith('/files/')) {
const fileName = path.basename(pathname.slice(7));
const filePath = path.join(CONTENT_DIR, fileName);
// Reject empty/dotfile names and anything that isn't a regular file —
// `/files/` would otherwise resolve to CONTENT_DIR and crash readFileSync (EISDIR).
if (!fileName || fileName.startsWith('.') || !fs.existsSync(filePath) || !fs.statSync(filePath).isFile()) {
res.writeHead(404);
if (!fileName || fileName.startsWith('.') || !isRegularFileInsideContentDir(filePath)) {
res.writeHead(404, securityHeaders());
res.end('Not found');
return;
}
const ext = path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase();
const contentType = MIME_TYPES[ext] || 'application/octet-stream';
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': contentType });
res.writeHead(200, securityHeaders({ 'Content-Type': contentType }));
res.end(fs.readFileSync(filePath));
} else {
res.writeHead(404);
res.writeHead(404, securityHeaders());
res.end('Not found');
}
}
@@ -273,7 +333,7 @@ function handleRequest(req, res) {
const clients = new Set();
function handleUpgrade(req, socket) {
if (!isAuthorized(req)) { socket.destroy(); return; }
if (!isAuthorized(req) || !isAllowedWebSocketOrigin(req)) { socket.destroy(); return; }
const key = req.headers['sec-websocket-key'];
if (!key) { socket.destroy(); return; }